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Leader-driven Change from Aquino to Duterte: 
Towards a Redirection or Restructuring in 
Philippine Foreign Policy?  
  
Andrea Chloe Wong 




The global perceptions of leaders have significant influence in a 
state’s foreign policy. In the Philippines’ case, the striking 
contrast between Presidents Benigno Aquino III, who possesses 
a moralist and liberalist views, and Duterte, who holds a 
legalist and realist global perceptions, led to significant changes 
in their foreign policies. These are evident in their conflicting 
stance on two cases involving the death penalty of a Filipino 
worker in Indonesia in 2013; and the country’s maritime 
arbitration case with China filed in 2013 and eventually won in 
2016. Their divergence caused important leader-driven changes, 
which may result in either a redirection or a restructuring in the 
country’s foreign policy.  
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Introduction 
Abraham Lincoln once told his cabinet: "Gentlemen, the vote is 11 to 
1 and the 1 has it.”  
Such statement reveals the significant power and influence of 
leaders in making decisions concerning the nation. Snyder et al 
(1962, p. 65) asserts that: “It is one of our basic methodological 
choices to define the state as its official decision makers – those 
whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the 
acts of the state.”  
Generally, a leader acting in behalf of his/her country 
influences state policies and actions. In matters related to the 
nation’s foreign policy, such individual “shapes history because 
it is their choices and decisions that drive the course of events” 
(Breuning 2007, p. 11). When a single individual has the power 
to make choices concerning how a state is going to respond to a 
foreign policy problem, he/she becomes the “predominant 
leader” acting as the critical decision unit. Hermann et. al (2001, 
p. 84) describes such leader as the one person that has “the 
ability to commit the resources of the society and the power to 
make a decision that cannot be readily reversed.”  
This “predominance” of state leadership is highlighted in 
this study, emphasizing the individual level of analysis in 
determining the extent of its influence in a state’s foreign 
policy. It underscores Herman’s (1976, p. 328) contention that 
“the more authority (or personal control) heads of state have 
over foreign policy, the more likely their personal 
characteristics are to affect foreign policy behavior.” Culling 
from studies of political psychology and cognitive theory, 
Alden and Aran (2012, p. 19) argues that it is important to 
“focus on the mind of the decision maker, its powerful effect on 
the framing of particular foreign policy issues, and the 
Leader-driven Change from Aquino to Duterte: Towards a Redirection or 
Restructuring in Philippine Foreign Policy?   
Thesis, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2020    111 
consequent impact on the formulation and selection of policy 
options.”  
Specifically, this study examines the global perceptions of 
state leaders that guide their foreign policies and consequently 
affect state actions. How a leader views the world provides the 
general notion of his/her predisposition towards international 
affairs. In effect, a leader’s global perceptions influence how 
he/she will define the situation when confronted with an 
international or bilateral issue, and consequently influence the 
approach or strategy the government will adopt in its foreign 
policy.  
And with the examination of the global perceptions of 
individual leaders, there is a high probability of encountering 
differences between them that may result in changes in the 
state’s foreign policy. This is especially apparent when 
examining successive leaderships with divergent perspectives 
and approaches in foreign policy issues. However, this study 
acknowledges Gustavsson’s (1999) contention that leaders are 
seen as only one factor among many that may influence policy 
change. In fact, it also recognizes the valid assertions of scholars 
such as Foyle (1999) and Greenstein (1969) who have previously 
warned not to assume that leaders “always” matter (given the 
existence of other political, structural, and institutional 
constraints influencing policy). Yet for the purpose of this 
study, it emphasizes the importance of these individuals and 
their own unique global perceptions, which provide powerful 
explanations in the modification of a state’s foreign policy. 
Specifically, this study subscribes to Hermann’s (1990) 
theory of “leader-driven change.” Such change is the result of 
“the determined efforts of an authoritative policy maker, 
frequently the head of government, who imposes his own 
vision of the basic redirection necessary in foreign policy 
(p.11).” In particular, the leader-driven change in this study 
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examines one head of state to another. This is in contrast to 
“self-correcting” leader-driven change, which occurs when the 
head of the existing government elect to move in a different 
policy direction or change course in his/her foreign policy 
(Hermann 1990, p. 5). Either way, both types of leader-driven 
change reinforce Gustavsson’s (1999) argument that at the 
individual level of analysis, the state decision-maker is at the 
core of the foreign policy change. 
The focus on leader-driven change and its impact on the 
state’s foreign policy raises the following questions: Since 
leaders have the responsibility of making decisions in behalf of 
the state, how do their global perceptions shape a country’s 
foreign policy in dealing with international issues or problems? 
And in examining leaders individually, how do their different 
global perceptions affect changes on how the state pursues its 
external affairs? To what extent do their diverse perspectives 
and the consequent changes affect the shift in the country’s 
foreign policy?  
To address these questions, this study provides an 
assessment on the global perceptions of Philippine Presidents 
Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016-
2022) and their impact in the country’s foreign policy. Aquino 
holds a moralist and liberalist views, while Duterte possesses 
legalist and realist global perceptions in addressing external 
issues. Their differences are evident in how they addressed the 
two cases examined in this study. The first focuses on Mary 
Jane Veloso, an overseas Filipino worker who was sentenced to 
death in Indonesia for drug trafficking in 2013. The second case 
discusses the Philippines’ arbitration case against China on the 
West Philippine Sea, which it filed in 2013 and eventually won 
in 2016. 
Both cases bring to light their differences in global 
perceptions, resulting in significant changes that correspond to 
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a particular shift in the country’s foreign policy. This study then 
distinguishes two types of change and its consequent foreign 
policy shift---- changes in problem/goal result in the 
‘redirection’ of the state’s foreign policy, while a change in 
international orientation cause a ‘restructuring’ in its foreign 
policy.  
This study argues that the divergent global perceptions 
between leaders resulted in changes in the state’s policy goals. 
These are manifested in policy statements or actions of Duterte 
that departs from or rejects Aquino’s initial problem 
stipulations or prior goals on both cases. But despite the 
striking contrast between their global perceptions, this does not 
translate into the transformation of the country’s international 
orientation, which requires a pattern of changes in its external 
activities and partnerships. Thus, this study contends that the 
Philippines experiences a redirection and not a restructuring of 
its foreign policy, and consequently reflected a “weakened” 
stance for the country and inconsistencies in its actions.  
This evaluation of global perceptions of leaders and 
foreign policy change aims to further add to the literature on 
leader-driven change affecting a state’s approach on 
international issues. Though there are several studies (Hermann 
1990, Holsti 1982, and Breuning 2007 among others) examining 
the influence of leaders, there are only a few (such as Doeser 
2013) which discussed the degree in which they impact the shift 
in foreign policy. This is considered relevant because examining 
the peculiarities of successive state leaderships can provide 
scholars, policy makers, and observers an informed 
understanding on the policy changes they may initiate and their 
possible impact on the country. 
Moreover, an analysis on the Philippines may be an 
interesting reference for other countries that are highly 
influenced by leader-driven changes in its foreign policy. This is 
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particularly relevant for states with similar personality-based 
political culture and underdeveloped political institutions.  By 
examining the global perceptions of leaders, this study 
therefore seeks to provide observers a cautionary indication of a 
country’s policies and actions, and to make sense of its possible 
alterations as reflected in the case of the Philippines. At the 
conclusion of this study, it then recommends future analysis of 
the global perceptions of successive leaders to identify their 
differences and their subsequent policy changes. This should 
determine the prospects of whether the country will undergo a 
restructuring or a redirection in its foreign policy. 
 
Global Perceptions of Leaders  
This study’s focus on leader-driven change takes its reference 
on previous literature on American presidents and their foreign 
policies. In Neustadt’s work on Presidential Power (1990), he 
focused on the “personal” rather than “institutional” 
presidency, which emphasizes on the importance of leadership 
style. Although he initially puts each American president in an 
institutional context that constrain their actions, Neustadt’s 
description of presidential power emphasized the fundamental 
importance of their personal characteristics. He also discussed 
the ability of presidents to obtain the kind of “personal 
influence of an effective sort on governmental action,” which he 
defined as presidential power. Such emphasis on the 
“personal” presidency is especially relevant in the Philippines’ 
case with a less developed foreign policy organization in 
political institutions. As claimed by Hermann (1976, p. 328) in 
her earlier work, “the personal characteristics of the 
predominant leaders will more likely impact its foreign policy 
in underdeveloped states.” 
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Another important literature is Barber’s (1972) book 
entitled The Presidential Character, which examines the ‘personal’ 
in the presidency. It employs psychobiography to explain the 
character, worldview, and style of modern presidents. He 
explains that ‘style’ reflects the habitual way a president 
performs his political role; ‘character’ seen as the way in which 
a president orients toward life and his own merits; and 
‘worldview’ involves the leader’s primary and politically 
relevant beliefs (1972, p. 6). Barber notes that these components 
of the presidential character fit together in a dynamic package 
understandable in psychological terms.  
While presidential style and character are important, this 
study emphasizes on the worldview that has significant 
implications on the global perceptions of Philippine presidents. 
How situations are assessed will be based on a leader’s 
observations of reality that seeks to simplify and organize the 
external environment. Departing from ‘strict rationality,’ these 
perceptions provide insights into why a state behaves the way 
it does from the way its decision makers identify their situation 
(Snyder et al 1962, p. 65). According to their ‘definition of the 
situation,’ the perceptions of leaders influence their decisions 
and the implementation of their state’s foreign policy. It also 
introduces distortions in how leaders perceive reality based on 
three associated elements:  
‘Belief’ refers to a leader’s fundamental assumptions about the 
world affects a leader’s interpretation of his environment and 
consequently the strategies that the leader employs; ‘Ideology’ 
involves a set of values and principles that determine and guide 
his/her behaviour; ‘Images’ affect how a leader views 
international events as well as other countries and leaders. Such 
images are rooted in a leader’s stereotypes, biases, and other 
subjective sources (Boulding 1959).  
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The examination of a leader’s belief, images, and ideology 
provides the basis of his/her general orientation or 
predisposition in international affairs. These interrelated factors 
of the leader’s global perceptions tend to shape the content or 
substance of the state’s foreign policy. Through its assessment, 
one is able to comprehend his/her predispositions and 
approaches in dealing with a foreign policy problem---“how he 
will define the situation and the style of behavior he will likely 
emphasize” (Hermann 1980, p. 12-13). Having knowledge of 
how a leader views the world provides important indications 
into a country’s policy stance and actions on international 
issues.  
 
Changes in Foreign Policy: Towards Redirection or 
Restructuring?   
In the assessment of the leaders’ global perceptions, their 
differences manifest shifts in the state’s foreign policy in 
varying degrees. This study thus deviates from Eidenfalk’s 
(2009) assumption that “the process of policy change begins 
with a change in the environment, and not with the individual 
decision-maker,” though this is a common probability. Instead, 
it argues that policy adjustments can begin with individuals, 
who have certain global perspectives that can contribute to the 
particular characteristics of the change in policy.  
This is particularly evident when examining two 
successive leaders with different global perceptions that result 
in changes in a country’s foreign policy adjustments. In fact, the 
degree of divergence in the global perceptions of leaders 
determine the level of change in a state’s foreign policy. Thus, 
this study contends that the lesser the differences in perception, 
the less drastic the changes in the state’s foreign policy. 
Whereas the wider the differences in the leader’s global 
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perception, the more radical the changes in the state’s foreign 
policy. 
Such modifications can be subjected to four graduated 
levels of change. To identify these levels, the definition of 
‘foreign policy’ is initially established. According to Hermann 
(1990, p.5), it is a “program (plan) designed by authoritative 
policy makers to address problem or pursue goals that entails 
action toward foreign entities. This program presumably 
specifies the conditions and instruments of statecraft.” Based on 
this definition, he enumerates the levels of policy changes as 
follows:  
(1) Adjustment Changes. Changes occur in the level of 
effort (greater or lesser) and/or in the scope of recipients 
(such as refinement in the class of targets). What is done, 
how it is done, and the purposes for which it is done 
remain unchanged. 
(2) Program Changes. Changes are made in the methods 
or means by which the goal or problem is addressed. It 
involves new instruments of statecraft (such as the 
pursuit of a goal through diplomatic negotiation rather 
than military force). What is done and how it is done 
changes, but the purposes for which it is done remain 
unchanged.  
(3) Problem/Goal Changes. The initial problem or goal 
that the policy addresses is replaced or simply forfeited. 
In this foreign policy change, the purposes themselves are 
modified.  
(4) International Orientation Changes. This entails a basic 
shift in the state’s international role and activities. Not 
one policy but many are more or less simultaneously 
changed.  
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With emphasis on the last two levels of change, this study 
argues that they correspond to a characterization of the state’s 
foreign policy shift: changes in problem/goal results in the 
‘redirection’ of the state’s foreign policy, while changes in 
international orientation causes a ‘restructuring’ of its foreign 
policy.   
This argument builds on Hermann’s (1990) discussion on 
changes in a state’s foreign policy. According to him, “the last 
three forms of change--- change in means (program), ends 
(goal), or overall orientation indicate a foreign policy 
redirection” (p.6). But this study deviates from Hermann’s 
(1990) definition and contends that problem/goal changes 
(which commonly starts with adjustments and program 
changes in a state’s foreign policy) can already be characterized 
as a foreign policy ‘redirection.’ Such change involves policy 
statements or actions that are incompatible, if not open 
rejection, of previous goals. This study then detaches the 
change in international orientation from Hermann’s (1990) 
definition of foreign policy redirection, and instead separately 
labels it as foreign policy ‘restructuring.’ 
Such transformation in the state’s international 
orientation has graver implications than problem/goal changes 
in its foreign policy. Holsti (1982, p. 20) defines international 
orientation as the “general attitudes and commitments toward 
the external environment, and is rarely revealed in any one 
decision, but results from a series of cumulative decisions to 
adjust state’s objectives, values, and interests with conditions 
and characteristics of the external environments.” And 
according to Hermann (1990, p. 5-6), “in contrast to lesser forms 
of change in terms of the state’s approach to a single issue, an 
orientation change involves dramatic shifts in both words and 
deeds in multiple issue areas with respect to the state’s 
international role and activities as well as its relationship with 
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external entities.” In particular, such change usually occurs 
“both in the pattern of partnerships (trade shifts from US to 
China) and in the type of activity (a country withdraws from an 
international organization).” This study then characterizes such 
change in international orientation as foreign policy 
restructuring because of the gravity of its effect and its 
prolonged impact on the state. 
 
Examining the Predominance of Philippine Presidents in 
Foreign Policy  
The case of the Philippines highlights the leaders’ important 
role in crafting and implementing its foreign policy. Philippine 
presidents are considered “predominant leaders” who have the 
power and authority to make critical decisions on the country’ 
external affairs. With constitutional authority, the president’s 
power has wide political latitude to make quicker and more 
decisive actions concerning the country’s external affairs. Often 
referred to as the chief architect of foreign policy, a Philippine 
president “can redefine priorities, dictate the tone and posture 
in the international community, and even personally manage 
diplomacy with selected countries if he/she so wishes, subject 
to some structural constraints” (Baviera 2015). As Preston (2010, 
p.3) describes, this type of leader can “authoritatively allocate 
resources and personally make policy decisions for the state, in 
which case an analytical focus upon the leaders themselves tells 
us a great deal about their likely foreign policies.”  
This study therefore seeks to focus on the ‘predominance’ 
of Philippine presidents as a major entity in the country’s 
foreign policy, though it also recognizes other relevant factors. 
It acknowledges the significance of Preston’s (2010) proposition 
to take a more nuanced approach that requires “examining 
his/her given situational contexts in order to determine how 
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much the environment will allow restructuring, and how much 
these constrain their behaviors (p. 3-4).” However, such 
assessment involving institutional or political restrictions have 
limited constraints in how Philippine presidents make or 
implement policies. And because of its personality-based 
political culture, the Philippine presidency possesses much 
leeway to put his/her personal stamp on the nation’s foreign 
policy. In fact, an assessment of the Philippines’ international 
affairs and external relations is generally based on an 
evaluation of presidential administrations such as the Marcos 
foreign policy (1965-1986), the Ramos (1992-1998) foreign 
policy, or the Arroyo foreign policy (2001-2010). 
To examine Philippine foreign policy, it is important to 
initially acknowledge the challenging task in assessing the 
global perceptions of Aquino and Duterte. Such task requires 
getting ‘inside’ the minds of leaders to understand their 
attitudes and beliefs with respect to a particular issue (Arnold 
Wolfers 1962). This is the reason why Wilkenfeld et al. (1980, 
p.42) concludes that this “psychological domain is the most 
elusive and least amenable to systematic empirical analysis.” 
Yet despite the difficulties of direct observation, it is still 
possible to obtain data and make some fairly accurate 
judgments on the global perceptions of Aquino and Duterte. 
Indirect means are utilized in this study, which include 
analyzing speeches and public statements, drawing insights 
from public interviews or biographies, making inferences about 
traits and motivations from behavior, evaluating their public 
reputations, or relating previous foreign policy decisions and 
actions to suggest a particular inclination. This indirect 
approach is inspired by Margaret Hermann (1976; 1980) who 
developed a rigorous leader assessment-at-a-distance technique 
from a huge collection of path-breaking research that explored 
how leaders shape and affect foreign policy 
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Global Perceptions of Benigno Aquino III  
Aquino was born on 8 February 1960 in Manila, Philippines. 
His father was Benigno Aquino Jr., who was regarded as a 
national hero after his assassination for his unrelenting pursuit 
to reinstitute democracy in the Philippines during the 
dictatorial regime of Ferdinand Marcos. His mother was 
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the most prominent figure of the 
1986 People Power Revolution that toppled Marcos and led to 
her installation as the first female president of the country.  
With his political pedigree, Aquino also established his 
career in politics. A fourth-generation politician, he started his 
political life as a member of the House of Representatives for 
nine years, and subsequently served as a senator for three 
years. Aquino eventually became the 15th President of the 
Philippines after winning the 2010 national elections. Never 
considering himself as the nation’s “saviour,” Aquino pledged 
to “set the example” himself to be an ethical and honest public 
servant.  
Aquino’s perceptions about the world is largely shaped 
by his morals beliefs and liberal ideology. Because of the 
political legacies of his parents, Aquino continued to espouse 
democratic values in his governance platform. Often regarded 
as an ‘accidental president,’ he is also regarded as a “unique 
conception of political ambition based on a moralistic fulfilment 
of a larger obligation to the collective” (Heydarian 2013).  
Aquino is also influenced by the images he holds about 
the world. Though he perceives the anarchic world as unfair 
and corrupt, Aquino believes that through democratic 
institutions and good governance, it can be better. It is a 
paradigm that “assumes the application of reason in paving a 
way for a more orderly, just and cooperative world, restraining 
disorder that can be policed by institutional reforms” (Dizon 
and Cabalza 2016).  
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Global Perceptions of Rodrigo Duterte  
Rodrigo Duterte was born on March 28, 1945 in Leyte, 
Philippines. His father served as a local mayor and governor, 
while his mother was a public school teacher. He became Davao 
City mayor in 1988, re-elected six times, and occupied the 
position for more than twenty years before becoming the 
country’s president. Duterte succeeded Aquino as the 16th 
president of the Philippines after winning the 2016 national 
elections.  
Duterte won the presidency as an anti-elite politician with 
a tough-talking attitude. According to Tanyag (2018), Duterte 
was skilled in harnessing public emotions as a “constitutive 
element of governance such as the propagation of oppositional 
thinking of ‘us versus them.’’ Based on his promise of overnight 
salvation, he has effectively tapped into the public’s frustrations 
over government inefficiencies led by the corrupt and 
insensitive political elites.  
Duterte’s perception about the world is shaped by his 
personal beliefs and ideology. He believes in the principle 
behind ‘consequentialism’ in which the end justifies the means 
(that are presumably wrong) to achieve a supposed (and often 
uncertain) outcome. This is reflected in his autocratic tendencies 
that promote the methodical use of the state’s coercive power in 
order to achieve prompt implementation of policies. An 
example of such autocratic tendency is his administration’s 
brutal ‘war on drugs’ that allegedly involved extra-judicial 
killings of mere drug suspects without due process.  
A novice in international relations, Duterte is also 
influenced by the images he holds about the world. He views 
the anarchic world in “black and white, with hardly any shades 
of grey in between” (Misalucha-Willoughby 2016). This 
resonates with his own philosophy that emphasizes less on 
morality, which he regards as irrelevant in determining 
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whether the state’s action is good or bad, as long as it paves the 
way for the pursuit of his version of national interest or political 
goals. To survive in the anarchic world, he believes that the 
state should exercise its relative power to safeguard its 
interests.  
 
Case Analysis  
To assess the impact of Aquino and Duterte’s contrasting global 
perceptions, this study presents cases that reveal the 
consequent differences in the country’s foreign policy and 
approach.  
The Philippines’ Petition to Save the Life of Filipino Worker in 
Indonesia  
Mary Jane Veloso, a Filipino worker, was arrested in 
Yogyakarta International Airport in April 2010 for carrying 
heroin in her luggage. Throughout her trial, she maintained her 
innocence, claiming that she was duped by an international 
criminal syndicate and unknowingly brought drugs on her way 
to work as a maid in Indonesia. Yet Veloso was eventually 
sentenced to death for drug trafficking and she was scheduled 
to be executed by firing squad on 29 April 2015. President 
JokoWidodo earlier rejected appeals for clemency, maintaining 
that countries with nationals facing death sentences in 
Indonesia should respect the ‘supremacy’ of its laws.  
With mounting pressures from the Filipino public, the 
Aquino administration made numerous appeals to save Veloso.  
It filed several requests for judicial review on Veloso’s case and 
pleaded to commute her sentence to life imprisonment. It also 
cited the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), an 
important treaty that aims to fight transnational crimes in the 
region. 
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At the eleventh hour before Veloso’s scheduled execution, 
Aquino made a phone call and talked directly to the Foreign 
Minister of Indonesia. This was considered a breach in normal 
diplomatic protocol when state leaders are supposed to directly 
talk with their counterparts. In that last-minute phone call, 
Aquino invoked the ASEAN treaty and notified Indonesia that 
it had custody over Veloso’s recruiters who were allegedly 
involved in human trafficking and drug smuggling. He then 
requested the Indonesian Foreign Minister to spare Veloso so 
she can testify as a witness in these illegal activities.  
After Aquino’s phone call and hours before Veloso’s 
scheduled execution, the Indonesian government granted her a 
temporary reprieve. It announced that the deferment of 
Veloso’s execution was for her to testify against members of the 
criminal syndicate who victimized her. While it continued with 
the execution of other foreign nationals convicted of drug 
trafficking, the Indonesian government explained that its 
decision to delay the execution of Veloso was to fully ascertain 
if she was just a mule, and not a drug dealer.  
Case Status:  
President Widodo insisted that Veloso’s death sentence was 
“not a cancellation but a postponement." He maintained that 
her fate would depend on prevailing laws in Indonesia and 
how the Philippine court would rule on the case against her 
recruiters.  
In contrast to Aquino’s vigorous efforts, Philippine 
President Rodrigo Duterte meanwhile admitted that he felt 
awkward about “begging” President Widodo to spare Veloso’s 
life. Because of his hard-line stance against illegal drugs, 
Duterte announced that he would be ready to accept 
Indonesia’s decision about the case and “we will respect the 
judgement of its courts. We will honor what the laws are in 
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their country. We will not impose. We will not demand. 
Nothing. (Kabiling 2016)."  
In January 2018, the Philippine court barred efforts to 
secure Veloso’s testimony in Indonesia, stating that this would 
violate the constitutional rights of the accused. Such right 
entitles her alleged recruiters to confront Veloso in person. 
However, the Indonesian government does not allow foreign 
convicts to temporarily leave the country even for the purpose 
of providing testimonies, and also prohibits deposition via 
online video-conferencing. In the end, Indonesia may 
eventually revoke Veloso’s temporary reprieve from death row, 
and proceed with her execution if there will be no significant 
developments in her case.  
Aquino’s ‘Moralist’ vs. Duterte’s ‘Legalist’ Global Perception  
Aquino’s utmost consideration for the sanctity of human rights 
and the preservation of life reflect his moralist global 
perception. This brought about his profound keenness to fight 
for Veloso’s survival, which is manifested in his strong 
commitment and proactive stance to save her.  
As a result, the Philippines under his administration 
made various efforts to spare her from the death penalty. This 
included requesting for judicial review, invoking a regional 
treaty, and making a national appeal to President Widodo. 
Instead of conceding her fate to the death penalty, the country 
was able to convince Indonesia to make her a state witness that 
eventually kept her alive (albeit temporarily pending her 
ongoing case). The decision of the Indonesian government to 
grant Veloso a last-minute suspension of her execution is 
considered a temporary victory for the Philippines.  
In contrast to Aquino, Duterte subscribes to a more 
legalist perspective that focus less on morality in determining 
or judging state actions. He stresses more on the respect for 
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other countries’ sovereignty and rule of law. He believes that 
anyone involved in illegal drugs should be punished. And with 
his own anti-narcotics campaign, Duterte exhibits lack of 
concern over Veloso’s death penalty case in Indonesia.  
His global perception resulted in the Philippines’ 
indifferent policy stance on Veloso’s case--- bequeathing her 
fate into the hands of Indonesia’s prevailing laws, minus the 
moral considerations. The country’s “hands-off” attitude under 
the Duterte led to its diminished resolve to save Veloso without 
any drive to find alternatives to address the legal impediments 
in her ongoing case in Indonesia’s court. 
 
The Philippines’ Arbitration Case against China  
In April 2012, the Philippine Navy deployed its military vessel 
to arrest the Chinese fishermen illegally poaching in the 
Scarborough Shoal. China quickly dispatched maritime vessels 
to prevent the Philippine Navy from capturing its fishermen. 
With both countries’ vessels squaring off at the shoal, the 
Philippines and China found themselves locked in a “face-to-
face test of sovereignty” (Ratner 2013, 1). However, the Chinese 
government scored a tactical victory when the Philippines 
“conceded a dramatic ten-week standoff by withdrawing its 
maritime vessels, under the facing-saving auspices of an 
oncoming typhoon” in June 2012 (Ratner 2013, 2). Since then, 
China has retained its maritime vessels at the shoal, effectively 
seizing it and exercising control of the area.  
Since the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, the 
Philippines under the Aquino administration had to employ 
diplomatic and legal approaches to counterbalance China’s 
illegal activities and aggressive intrusions. Its reaction on the 
escalating maritime tensions has been ‘sustained defiance.’ 
According to Baviera (2016, 125): “These incidents helped build 
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its resolve to do exactly what China asks it not to do--- 
internationalize the South China Sea disputes and invite a 
greater role for the US in the resolution of the disputes.” And 
most importantly, his administration raised the stakes by filing 
a case against China before an Arbitral Tribunal under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 
January 2013.  
Following the three-year proceedings, the PCA finally 
issued its decision in July 2016 in favor of the Philippines. The 
Chinese government rejected the arbitral tribunal’s decision. 
But for the Philippines, the arbitral proceedings were intended 
to achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the maritime 
dispute.  
Arbitration Award Status:  
After Duterte assumed the presidency in 2016, his 
administration focused on reviving bilateral ties that have been 
effectively frozen during the Aquino administration. Thus 
when the PCA delivered its ruling on the Philippines’ case 
against China merely two weeks into his presidency, Duterte 
chose to downplay the country’s legal victory. In his state visit 
to China in October 2016, he regarded the tribunal’s ruling as “a 
piece of paper with four corners,” and that the case would “take 
the back seat” in his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. 
Further, Duterte stated: “The arbitral award gives us the right. 
China has the historical right. And they’re insisting. In this 
situation, do we argue, or do we just talk? I would say, let us 
put it [off] to some other day (Zhen 2016).” His policy statement 
caused a diminished international pressure on China to comply 
with the award that is favorable to the Philippines. His 
administration’s effort to bilaterally engage China marks a 
reversal in Philippine foreign policy since he took office in June 
2016. 
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Aquino’s ‘Liberalist’ vs. Duterte’s ‘Realist’ Global Perceptions  
Aquino’s liberal perspectives are reflected in diplomatic 
approaches that sought to avoid military confrontations with 
China. This included the Aquino administration’s signing of the 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the 
US in 2014, which was perceived as a strategic move to 
counterbalance China’s heavy-handed behaviour over the 
South China Sea. The agreement allowed American forces to 
have strategic rotational presence in the Philippines and 
granted extensive access to the country’s military facilities. 
EDCA is expected to be the Philippines’ deterrent against any 
military confrontation with China.  
In addition, Aquino’s liberal perspective is manifested in 
his emphasis on regional institutions to address maritime issues 
with China. He lobbied his ASEAN colleagues to unify as a bloc 
and to seek a central position among claimant states in the 
region. He also renewed calls for the immediate adoption of the 
implementing guidelines and a more binding code of conduct 
in response to Chinese maritime intrusions.  
Most importantly, Aquino’s liberal perspective is 
demonstrated in his adherence to international legal 
institutions. Through the arbitration case, he deems that a 
sovereign state such as the Philippines can gain an equal 
footing in the court of law despite the apparent power 
asymmetry with China. Aquino’s idealist convictions and 
liberal principles asserts that “right is might” rather than 
“might makes right.”  
Such legal effort revealed the Philippines’ strong 
commitment to defend its maritime interests and its refusal to 
concede to China’s more superior military power in the South 
China Sea. The historic legal case against the Chinese was a 
bold move by the Aquino administration that no country, much 
less a small state, dared to do. But when the Philippines filed 
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and eventually won its case, it temporarily lost whatever 
diplomatic goodwill it had with China during Aquino’s term.  
Meanwhile, Duterte holds a realist perspective that 
focuses on relative power that influences his policy on China. 
Because of the power asymmetry between the two countries, he 
believes that the Philippines cannot win control over its 
territories, even if the country achieved victory in its arbitration 
case. According to Duterte’s spokesman, while the 
administration never shelved the arbitral ruling, “it only 
remains unenforceable because no foreign force seems 
persuaded to help us enforce it. Neither do we have the 
capability of enforcing it alone by force (Romero 2019)." 
Moreover, Duterte’s global perception exhibits a clear-cut 
‘either-or’ approach in managing the Philippines’ relations with 
China. His verbal insinuations suggest that if he pushes the 
country’s arbitral award, the Philippines will have to face 
military confrontations. According to Duterte: "I cannot afford 
at this time to go to war. I cannot go to a battle which I cannot 
win and would only result in the destruction and probably a lot 
of losses for our Armed Forces (Ranada 2016)."  
In his desire to renew ties with China, Duterte toned 
down his government’s actions regarding the country’s 
maritime interests that may be deemed hostile by the Chinese. 
For one, he disregarded the Philippines’ defense alliance with 
the US declaring that: “If America cared, it would have sent its 
aircraft carriers and missile frigates the moment China started 
reclaiming land in contested territory, but no such thing 
happened” (Lacorte 2015). His administration also ceased 
lobbying for regional support against China’s maritime 
aggression in the South China Sea. This was evident during the 
country’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2017, when it released its 
chairman’s statement avoiding any reference to China’s 
ongoing reclamation activities in the area. There was also no 
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mention of the Hague ruling, which declared that China has no 
legal basis to claim historic rights over the South China Sea.  
Rather than confronting China to respect the tribunal 
ruling, Duterte opted to renew relations with China. 
Specifically, he aims to gain as much economic concessions 
from China as possible, such as financial assistance and direct 
investments that the Chinese are willing to provide. Thus in his 
state visit to China in 2016, Duterte brought home USD 24 
billion in investments, credit and loan pledges from the Chinese 
government aimed at funding the Philippines’ infrastructure 
projects.  These economic pledges reveal Duterte’s notion that 
the Philippines is better off not to be trapped in a political 
deadlock by flaunting its arbitral award that is hard to enforce.  
 
Goal Changes Towards a Redirection in Philippine 
Foreign Policy   
The differences in the global perceptions between Aquino and 
Duterte generally exposes their keenness and interest (or lack 
thereof) in both cases. Aquino displayed a determined keenness 
to initiate proactive efforts to save Veloso in Indonesia and to 
defend the country’s maritime interests through its arbitration 
case against China. But Duterte overturned Aquino’s previous 
efforts in both cases. He exhibited a lack of interest in saving 
Veloso and expressed disinterest in pushing for its arbitration 
victory to promote its maritime rights. This dramatic 
turnaround manifest a significant leader-driven change in the 
Philippines’ foreign policy goals. 
In the first case analysis, the prior goal of keeping Veloso 
alive under Aquino’s term is ignored by the Duterte 
administration. Aquino’s moralist views and adherence to 
human rights is manifested in his government’s proactive and 
concerted efforts to save her. But because of Duterte’s legalist 
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perspectives and respect for the rule of law and other country’s 
sovereignty, he passively left her fate to Indonesia’s justice 
system. In effect, the change in the Philippines’ foreign policy 
goal diminished its resolve to conclusively spare Veloso from 
Indonesia’s death penalty.  
In the second case, the initial goal of Aquino to 
counterbalance Chinese aggression through the Philippines’ 
arbitration case is set aside by Duterte. Aquino’s liberalist 
perspective motivated the filing of the case to push for the 
country’s maritime rights, which are constantly threatened by 
China’s military might. But Duterte’s realist perspective 
downplayed the Philippines’ arbitration victory believing that it 
is unenforceable given China’s superior military capabilities. 
Whereas Aquino’s goal focused on the defense of the country’s 
maritime rights, Duterte’s goal opted to concentrate on gaining 
economic concessions from the Chinese and renew bilateral ties. 
Since power asymmetry with China is evident, the Philippines 
under the Duterte administration instead seeks to benefit from 
it. As a result of such goal change, the Philippines’ displayed 
conflicting policies towards China.   
 
Conclusion  
These leader-driven changes in the country’s policy goals 
essentially reflect a redirection in its foreign policy. They are 
manifested in the policy statements or actions of the Duterte 
administration that reject or conflict with Aquino’s initial goals. 
This consequently caused a “weakened” stance and 
inconsistencies in the country’s policies and actions on both 
cases. In the long term, the frequent changes in policy goals 
may tend to result in the lack of continuity in the country’s 
foreign policy especially on ongoing issues with other 
countries.  
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But such leader-driven change does not yet represent a 
shift in the country’s international orientation. This refutes the 
general notion that changes in the leaders’ global perceptions 
result in changes in the country’s international orientation. 
Hence, both cases do not lead to a restructuring in its foreign 
policy, which carries graver consequences and long-standing 
implications. For a change in the country’s international 
orientation to occur requires a pattern of changes in its external 
policies and partnerships. This may involve consistently 
overlooking death row cases of overseas Filipinos or 
continuously downplaying the country’s arbitral award in 
bilateral dealings with the Chinese government or in regional 
or international forums. It may also include focusing on the 
country’s ties with China and discounting other traditional 
relations with US, Japan, or Australia. But it remains to be seen 
whether or not such pattern will occur that will cause a 
transformation in the country’s international orientation and 
consequently lead to its foreign policy restructuring.   
This study therefore recommends future studies 
regarding leader-driven change to discern the extent of foreign 
policy shifts the country will further undergo. In particular, an 
analysis on the global perceptions of succeeding leaders after 
Duterte can determine the consequent changes in Philippine 
foreign policy. If the next Philippine president holds a 
divergent global perception relative to Duterte, he/she may 
enact changes in policy goals that may result in another foreign 
policy redirection for the Philippines. But if the successor 
possesses similar global perception, then he/she will likely 
continue the policy goals of Duterte highlighting a pattern that 
may eventually change the country’s international orientation 
and subsequently cause a restructuring of Philippine foreign 
policy.  
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The Philippines typically experience modifications in its 
foreign policy and its approach towards other countries each 
time it undergoes transitions in presidential administrations 
with their own idiosyncrasies. The extent of the differences 
between its leaders has implications on the level of change and 
the magnitude of the country’s foreign policy shifts. Thus it is 
worthwhile to examine its state leaderships to be able to 
estimate the kind of foreign policy it will pursue especially on 
prevailing issues that require constancy in strategic attention. 
Generally, such analysis on the Philippines may also serve as an 
interesting reference for other countries that are highly 
influenced by leader-driven changes in its foreign policy. 
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